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Lepp and McNeil: Trial Judge as Gatekeeper for Scientific Evidence

THE TRIAL JUDGE AS GATEKEEPER FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
WILL OHIO RULE OF EVIDENCE 102 FRUSTRATE THE OHIO
COURTS' ROLE UNDER DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW?
by
MICHAEL LEPP * & CHRISTOPHER B. MCNEIL'*
INTRODUCTION

One of the disquieting, yet exciting, components of modem life is the remarkable
speed at which scientific knowledge, once thought unquestionable, is shown to be

dubious or uncertain. In one-tenth of a lifetime, we can see both the creation of new
scientific disciplines and the dismantling of scientific principles long held to be immutable.
Along with its volatility, scientific development offers staggering promise: DNA
screening, the product of computer-assisted research into the human genetic structure,
has the potential of freeing persons wrongly convicted of heinous crimes and securing
just convictions of those guilty of the same.' Where before, courts would not be in a
position to bring a case to judgment on the merits for want of evidence of causation,
scientific collaborations have led to the creation of new theories of tort liability, which
allow the proper judicial allocation of societal costs. 2 We have witnessed the patenting
of life forms and can predict the rapid growth of bio-technology and the infinite complexities likely to accompany such growth.3
Ours is a society that insists that our courts be capable participants in the development of these scientific advances (or retreats, as the case may be). Science and the
judicial process, however, can be strange bedfellows, and the modem trial court may be
ill-equipped to provide an adequate and fair forum forthe application of novel scientific
theories to the facts and circumstances of cases brought before it.
This article considers the role of the trial court in responding to the changes wrought
by scientific innovation. Particular consideration is given to the impact likely to be
* Hearing Officer, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. B.A. 1961, Hofstra University;, J.D. 1968, Rutgers University
School of Law. Chair, State Practice and Procedure Committee of the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges,
American Bar Association, 1984-86; Chair,Administrative Law Committee, Ohio State Bar Association, 1992-present.
** Assistant Attorney General, Ohio Attorney General, 1988-present. B.G.S. 1978,The University of Kansas,; J.D.
1981, The University of Kansas School of Law. Deputy Public Defender for 8th Judicial District of Kansas, 198183. Attorney, The State of Kansas Child Support Enforcement Office, Kansas City, 1985-88. Vice Chair, Publications
Committee of the Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division, American Bar Association, 1991-93.
1 Brad R. Byers, Comment, DNA Fingerprintingand the Criminal Defendant: Guilty or Innocent? Only His
MolecularBiologistKnowsforSure,16OioN.U.L. REv. 57(1989);CARNEGIECOMM'N ONSCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JuDIcIAL DECISION MAKING - CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND
MEETING CHALLENGES 43 (1993).
2 Kimberly M. Skaggs, NoteLimiting the Admissibility ofExpert Testimony: Christophersonv.Allied-Signal Corp.,

53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185 (1992).
' John H. Barton, Patenting Life: Entrepreneurs, Courts andBiotechnology Patents, 264 SCI. AM. 40 (1991).
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realized in Ohio trial courts from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.4 In Daubert,the Court laid to rest the
longstanding requirement from Frye v. United States,5 that for expert scientific testimony to be admissible, the principles upon which such testimony is based must have
achieved "general acceptance" within the relevant scientific community.6 In the Federal
forum, the Court supplanted the "austere" Frye7 test with Federal Evidence Rule 702,
which allows scientific opinion evidence that will "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue [by] a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education....."I
InDaubert,the Court enhances the trial court's gatekeeper role in entertaining novel
scientific theories: No longer may a court end its inquiry after obtaining an answer to the
question posed in Frye, whether the scientific testimony is based upon principles which
have achieved "general acceptance" within the relevant scientific community." While
"general acceptance" continues to be one element in the court's inquiry," the trial court's
task now must include determining whether the testimony is at least minimally reliable
and whether the testimony fits the facts. 12 Only "valid" evidence is admissible under
Federal Evidence Rule 702,11 and "validity" in turn depends upon a test composed of at
least the following five factors, denominated as the Court's "general observations:"' 4 (1)
whether the knowledge "can be (and has been) tested;"' 15 (2) whether the theory or
technique "has been subjected to peer review and publication; 1 16 (3) "the known or
potential rate of error;" 17 (4) in the case of a particular scientific technique, "the existence

Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2799.
7 Id. at 2794.
' FED. R. EVID. 702, as enacted by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
9 Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). Note that Daubert is limited to proffers of "scientific"
evidence only; the Court states that while Fed. R. Evid. 702 applies to "technical or other specialized knowledge,"
the discussion in Daubert is "limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here."
Id. at 2795 n.8.
10 Id. at 2794.
"
Id. at 2797.
12 Id. at 2796-97.
Is "The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. [Footnote omitted] Its ove~arching subject
is the scientific validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of those principles that underlie a
proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate." Id. at 2797.
14 Id. at 2796.
1 Id.
16 Id. at 2797.
17 Id.
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and maintenance of standards controlling the technique;" 18 and (5) the "general acceptance" or lack thereof in the scientific community. 9
Typically, such an enumeration would be welcomed by courts and parties alike as
it offers guidance regarding what does or does not meet the burdens imposed by the Rule.
In Ohio, however, the course charted by Daubert may be obscured by fundamental
differences between the Ohio Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
While Ohio Evidence Rule 702 and Federal Evidence Rule 702 are identical, Ohio
Evidence Rule 102 provides that the rules of evidence "shall be construed to state the
common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that a change is intended."' In
contrast, Federal Evidence Rule 102 provides that the Rules of Evidence shall be construed to promote ".. .growth and development of the law of evidence. .... "I In fact, in
Daubert, the Court stated that under the Federal Rules, no common law remains, although the common law "nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application."
In order to appreciate the significance of Ohio Evidence Rule102 in this context, it
is helpful to first examine some of the events leading to Daubert, especially the application (and in some instances, the rejection) of Frye both in Ohio and at the federal level.
Following that, this article will examine the rationale of Daubert as itmight apply in Ohio
given the limitations of Ohio Evidence Rule 102. Last, the recommendation is made that
this is an opportune time to align Ohio Evidence Rule 102 with Federal Evidence Rule
102, and to supplement the Ohio Rules of Evidence to expressly invest the trial court with
broad authority to appoint expert scientific witnesses in the manner already permitted
in Federal Evidence Rule 706.23
The Trial Court's Burden Under Daubert
Daubert was a toxic tort case involving the drug Bendectin, once widely prescribed
to combat morning sickness during pregnancy2 The plaintiffs were children born with
severely malformed limbs, which they alleged had been caused by their mothers' use of
the drug.' The case was originally filed in a California state court and removed on
1

Id.

'9 Id.; see generallyDaniel J. Capra,DecisionUnlikely to Have Real Impacton State orFederalToxic Tort Litigation,

21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 22 (Summer/Fall 1993).
10 OHIO R. EVID. 102 (effective July 1, 1980).
21 FED. R. EVID. 102.
" Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794 (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984)).
Both authors expressly state that while they are, respectively, a hearing officer and an assistant attorney general,
neither are presenting the views of their respective offices; rather, the views stated here are theirs alone, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of either the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency or the Ohio Attorney General.
2
Bert Black, Scientific Evidence after Daubert:Are the Frye Wars Over?, 1993 A.B.A. Bus. L Sec. Symposium
Judicial Controlof Scientific Evidence: The Implications ofDaubert, 4 (August 9, 1993).
1 Daubert,113 S.Ct. at 2791.
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diversity grounds to federal district court.6 In a motion for summary judgment, Merrell
Dow offered the affidavit of a well-credentialed expert regarding the risks from exposure
to various chemical substances.27 The expert had conducted a review of published
studies concerning Bendectin and the risk that it might be a substance capable of causing
malformations in fetuses. 2 Based on the expert's review of more than thirty published
studies, the expert concluded that Bendectin had not been shown to be a risk factor for
human birth defects. 29 The plaintiffs responded with expert testimony of their own,
which included conclusions that Bendectin can cause birth defects? 0 These conclusions
were based upon animal studies, studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin, and
"reanalysis" of previously published human statistical studies. 31
The trial court granted defendant drug manufacturer's motion for summary judgment after finding that the plaintiffs'expert testimony on causation lacked an adequate
scientific basis.32 After the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 33 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.3
The Supreme Court noted the "sharp divisions among the courts regarding the
proper standard for the admission of expert testimony"' 5 and in particular limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence? 6 The district court had granted summary judgment for defendant Merrell Dow after finding that scientific evidence is
admissible only if the principle upon which itis based is "'sufficiently established to have
general acceptance in the field to which it belongs. 3 7 The court of appeals affirmed,
citing Frye v. UnitedStatesl8 for the proposition that expert opinion based on a scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the
39
relevant scientific community.

26 Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2786.
27 Id. at 2790.
2$

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

11 Id. at 2791-92.
32 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128
(9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993); see also Black, supra note 24, at 4.
33 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
1

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 320 (1992).

s- Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2792.
36

Id. at 2792-93.

" Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmacueticals, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting United States v.
Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S.Ct. 2786(1993).
'
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S.Ct.
2786 (1993).
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The technique in question was the plaintiffs' reliance upon unpublished "reanalysis"
of previously published human statistical studies. 40 In affirming the district court's
decision, the court of appeals held that reanalysis is generally accepted by the scientific
community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field.4
The court concluded that the petitioners' evidence provided an insufficient foundation
to allow admission of expert testimony that Bendectin caused their injuries and, accordingly, that petitioners could not satisfy their burden of proving causation at trial.42
The focus of the Supreme Court's review was the "reasoning or methodology" by
which plaintiffs' experts reached their conclusion as to causation,' 3 and the trial court's
role in weighing the same:
Faced with the proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge
must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert
is proposing to testify to (1)scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier
of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts in issue. 44
This role is described not by Frye but by Federal Evidence Rule 702 which "clearly
contemplates some degree of regulation of the subject and theories about which an expert
may testify. 'If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assistthe trier
offact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' an expert 'may testify
thereto... ."5 Frye,on the other hand, limited the judicial role to an inquiry of whether
"the thing from which the deduction is made [is] sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."" Under Frye, "general
acceptance" is the "exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony," and the high
court found this test to be "absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of
Evidence," and held it should not be applied in federal trials.47
The Supreme Court found that the Fryetest had been superseded by the legislatively
enacted Federal Evidence Rule 702.4 The Frye test arose in a case "concerning the

40
"
42
41

Daubert, 113 S.CL at 2791-92.
Daubert,951 F.2dat 1131.
Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2792.
Id. at 2796.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
I5
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
"
Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2793 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
'I
Id. at 2794.
,Id. at 2793.
"
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admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test, a crude
precursor to the polygraph machine. '9 The test was quoted in Daubert:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deductionis made mustbe sufficiently establishedto have gained
generalacceptancein the particularfield in which it belongs.5 0
The Supreme Court noted that, in Frye, the results of the systolic blood pressure
deception test were ruled inadmissible because the test had "not yet gained such standing
and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made .... The Frye test became the dominant component of the law of expert testimony, and it inspired its share of academic debate.52 It
had also made its way into Ohio common law prior to the effective date of the Ohio Rules
"51

of Evidence.

53

The Court in Daubertfound that the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
called for a review broader than that called for in the Frye test and changed the role of
the trial court, enhancing its "gatekeeper" function in this respect. Judge Reavley of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has described Daubert's likely
impact on courts this way:
Judges who are solicitous of the jury's role as fact-finder, with the aid of
cross-examination and opposing experts under the adversary system, will
find reassurance in Daubert. Beside freeing them from Frye, the Daubert
court repeatedly stresses that the Federal Rules of Evidence mandate liberal
admissibility and full use of the adversary system to resolve factual disputes.

49 Id.

s Id. (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
I'
Id. (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
12 See id. at 2793 n. 4. ("Indeed, debates overFrye are such a well-established part of the academic landscape that
a distinct
term-'Frye-ologist'---has been advanced to describe those who take part.").
53
See, e.g., State v. Olderman, 336 N.E.2d 442, 447-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (voiceprint exemplars as the
spectrographic analysis of an accused's voice are, when properly qualified by expert witnesses and other evidence
as to their acceptance in the scientific community, admissible in a criminal trial) (citing Frye as the "standard of
admissibility of scientific evidence such as voice exemplars")). See also State v. Williams, No. CA-1999, 1982 WL
2940 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1982).
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While the Daubertmajority recognized that judges have gatekeeping responsibility to ensure evidentiary reliability, nothing in Daubertrequires
any new encroachment on the jury's role as factfinder....
The judge's role, according toDaubert,entails a thorough review of expert
testimony to ensure that the expert reached her conclusions through the
scientific method of hypothesis and testing. Opposing experts may effectively assist the judge in identifying where challenged expert testimony
departs from the scientific method. After fully understanding the testimony, the judge may exclude it after finding the expert supports her conclusions with inadequate testing, flawed logic, or excessive speculation.
Such testimony would be considered as not based on scientific knowledge
and, under Rule 702, would not get to a jury.5'
Under Daubert,then, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not follow the common
law as espoused in Frye, as the Rule required more than just a determination of "general
acceptance" of a methodology. Indeed, Daubertcalls for the trial court to exercise a
greater degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which a scientific expert
55
may testify than that required by Frye.
Under Daubert,the trial court now engages in a two-part analysis, focusing
first on whether the proffer entails "scientific knowledge" and second on whether
the knowledge "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ....
,,56
Thus, the subject proffered must be "scientific [which]
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures in science;"5 7 the word "'knowledge'. . . applies to any body of known facts orto any body of ideas inferred from
such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds."58
Next, in order for the testimony to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue," it must be relevant, and in this context it must relate to
an issue in the case.59 The testimony must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case
that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."w0

- Thbomas ReavleyDaubert May Be Read To Allow BroadJudicialControlIn EvaluatingReliability,21 Prod.Safety
& Liab. Rep., (BNA) No. 30, part 1 at 20 (Summer/Fall 1993).
1

Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794.

11 Id. at 2795.
57 Id.

56 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)).
59 Id. (citing 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVINDENCE $ 702[02], at 702-

18(1988)).
Id. at 2795-96 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).

6
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Unlike the testimony of the ordinary witness, the expert's testimony need not be
based upon first hand knowledge. 62 As interpreted in Daubert,
[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that
are not based on first-hand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and
703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of first-hand
knowledge- a rule which represents "a 'most pervasive manifestation' of
the common law insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of information,"'Advisory Committee's Notes onFed. RuleEvid. 603 (citationomitted)
is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. 3
According to Daubert,then, the trial judge, when faced with expert scientific testimony, must determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to scientific knowledge and whether the knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand or to determine
an issue. This in turn anticipates "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied appropriately to the facts in issue.'"
"[A] key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested."" This consideration relates to the notion that today's scientific methodology calls for generating hypotheses which are amenable to testing and falsification.'
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subject to
peer review and publication. This process of peer review and publication was absent in
the methodology employed by the expert witnesses for the plaintiffs in Daubert and this
absence led the court of appeals, when it applied the Frye test, to reject the "reanalysis"
relied uponto show that Bendectin could have caused the plaintiffs' birth defects. 67 Now,

6

See FED. R. EViD. 701.

62 Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. But cf. FED. R. EVID. 703, which permits the expert to base an opinion upon (1) facts

or data perceived by the expert, (2) facts or data made known to the expert at the hearing, or (3) facts or data made
known to the expert before the hearing; with Omo R. EVID. 703, which recognizes only the first two bases. See also
OHIo R. EVID. 703, Staff Note (which also notes that in Ohio "the hypothesis upon which an expert witness is asked
to state his opinion must be based upon facts within the personal knowledge of the witness or upon facts shown by
other evidence." (citing Burens v. Industrial Comm., 124 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1955); Kranerv. Coastal Tank Lines, 269
N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1971)).
'3
Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
67 Id. at 2792 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated,

113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993)).
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peer review and publication are but two of several factors relevant under Daubert."
Additional considerations for the trial court are the "known or potential rate of error"
and "the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation. '"
As it was in Frye, "general acceptance" is still important; however, it is no longer
the sole inquiry. As the trial court conducts its inquiry into the "reliability"" of a given
scientific technique, that assessment "does not require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community. '71 "Widespread acceptance can
be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and'a known technique
that has been able to attract only minimal support within the community' may properly
be viewed with skepticism.' ' n
In his dissent to Part II-B of Daubert,Chief Justice Rehnquist cautions against the
majority's "general observations,' warning that by proceeding to construe Federal
Evidence Rules 702 and 703 (after the issue became, in the Chief Justice's view, mooted
by Parts I and 11-A74), the majority's opinion may lead lower federal courts to inappropriately apply the same rationale in other cases involving expert scientific testimony:
"General observations" by this Court customarily carry great weight with
lower federal courts, but the ones offered here suffer from the flaw common
to most such observations - they are not applied to deciding whether or
not a particular testimony was or was not admissible, and therefore they
tend to be not only general, but vague and abstract. This is particularly
unfortunate in a case such as this, where the ultimate legal question depends
on an appreciation ofoneormore bodies ofknowledge notjudiciallynoticeable,
and subjectto different interpretations in the briefs ofthe parties and their amici: 5
In response, the majority opines that the better course for the Court, once it is agreed
that Federal Evidence Rule 702 "confides to the judge some gatekeeper responsibility,"
is forthe Court to "note the nature and source ofthat duty."76 But, how muchofthe"nature
and source" of the gatekeeper's duties will flow from Daubertto the trial court in Ohio?

Id. at 2797.
Id. (citations omitted).
o FED. R. EVID. 702, construedin Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2797.
7' Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2797 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985). See also 3
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 1702[03], at 702-41 to -42.
2 Daubert, 113 S.CL at 2797 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
73 Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
74 Id.
75 Id.
6 Id. at 2795 n. 7.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

Ohio Evidence Rule 102 and the Significance of Ohio Common Law
Frye met its demise in part because it had been superseded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.7 Those rules "occupy the field,' and "in principle, under the Federal Rules
no common law of evidence remains."71 The high court noted that a specific rule, Federal
Evidence Rule 702, speaks to offers of expert scientific testimony, that nothing in the
text of the Rule establishes "general acceptance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, that"[t]he drafting history ofRule 702 makes no mention ofFrye, and thata rigid
'general acceptance' requirement would be atodds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal
Rules and their'general approach ofrelaxingthe traditional baniers to'opinion'testimony. "I
The Ohio Rules of Evidence expressly provide for the Rules to be construed "to state
the common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that a change is intended and
shall not supersede substantive statutory provisions."' The Federal Rules of Evidence
contain no comparable language. While the Ohio and Federal Rules 702 are identical
in text, the construction of the two may be significantly different. By virtue of Ohio
Evidence Rule 102, Ohio Evidence Rule 702 must be construed consistently with common law, and does not "occupy the field" 2 in the manner attributed to its Federal
counterpart.
Does the Ohio trial judge have the ability to serve as the "gatekeeper" called for
under Daubert? An analysis of two similar cases with very dissimilar results suggests
the answer may be "maybe not."
The Frye doctrine, it should be noted, found safe harbor in Ohio case law, so as to
have been repeatedly embraced prior to the effective date of the Ohio Rules of Evi4 the Ohio Supreme Court approved
dence.8 3 In City of East Cleveland v. Ferell,8
a
rationale similar to that in Frye when considering the admissibility of radar evidence in
a speeding case: "The type of apparatus purporting to be constructed on scientific prinT7Id. at 2794.
s Id. (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)).
Ild. (quoting United States v. Able, 469 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1984)).
IId. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
sl OrIo R. EVID. 102:
The purpose of these rules is to provide procedures for the adjudication of causes to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. These rules shall be construed to state
the common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that a change is intended and shall not
supersede substantive statutory provisions.
Id.
Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794 (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984)).
OHIO R. EViD. 1102(A) (effective July 1, 1980).
u 154 N.E.2d 630 (Ohio 1958).
IId. at 632 (citations omitted).

82
83

"

362 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
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ciples must be accepted as dependable for the proposed purpose by the profession
concerned in that branch of science or its related arts."-' In State v. Smith,8 6the Ohio Court
of Appeals held that the results of a gunshot residue test could be admitted only after it
was established that "the test was based upon scientific principles which are accepted as
dependable for the proposed purpose by the profession concerned in that science or its
related art; and has gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.... '
The court in Smith held the state to the Frye standard and reversed a conviction where an
investigator had conducted a "modified" gunshot residue test, which relied upon a new
theoretical basis for which no "general acceptance" showing had been made.
Frye was thus a known and integral part of Ohio common law of expert scientific
testimony prior to 1980. The question then becomes: where does it fit after the passage
of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, given the limitation of Ohio Evidence Rule 102 that the
Rules be construed "to state the common law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates
that a change is intended"? 9 Is the Frye test of "general acceptance" incorporated into
Ohio Evidence Rule 702 as a common-law legacy, or has it been "superseded" by the
plain text of Ohio Evidence Rule 702?
The courts themselves have been inconsistent in applying Ohio Evidence Rule 102
or 702. Although it did not make specific reference to Ohio Evidence Rule 702, the Ohio
Supreme Court described the threshold for expert testimony in State v. Thomas,90involving a proffer showing the "battered wife syndrome":
The sole issue raised by the state in its appeal to this court is whetherthe trial
court committed reversible error by excluding testimony on the subject of
the "battered wife syndrome" by an expert on battered wives, where defendant pleaded self-defense to killing her husband. [S]uch expert testimony
is inadmissible because it is not distinctly related to some science, profession or occupations so as to be beyond the ken of the average lay person.
Furthermore, no general acceptance of the expert's particularmethodology
has been established.91

87

Id. at 1241.
I at 1244-47.
Id.

OynoR. EvID. 102. The StaffNotes toOhio EvidenceRule702 suggestthatnothing in Rule702indicates achange
is intended: "Rule 702 restates the law of Ohio as to the admissibility of testimony from expert witnesses." 01110R.
EVliD 702 Staff Note.
'
423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
91 Id. at 139-40 (Ohio 1981), overruled byStatev. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990). (footnote omitted)(citing Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013(D.C. Cir. 1923); McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman, 228 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1967)).
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The following year the court of appeals did construe Ohio Evidence Rule 702
(although not with any reference to Ohio Evidence Rule 102), in the case of State v.
Williams,92 which involved voiceprint evidence and the testimony of voiceprint experts.
In Williams, the court applied Frye and Ohio Evidence Rule 702 in this way: ".. .new
scientific tests when shown to be relevant and to be generally accepted by the scientific
community ought to be admitted into evidence. This is certainly in line with Rule 702
of the Ohio Rules of Evidence ....13
The court of appeals decision in Williams suggests that Frye has continued weight
in the determination of whether to accept a proffer of scientific evidence, and that to be
acceptable, the methodologies must meet the "general acceptance" test announced in
Frye, even though nothing in Ohio Evidence Rule 702 imposes such a requirement.
On the other hand, the Ohio Supreme Court has explicitly refused to adopt the Frye
test in one case, observing in a footnote that "[iIt has been persuasively argued that the
Frye test was silently abolished by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." In
State v. Johnston,the Ohio Supreme Court permitted the testimony of a witness in a
criminal proceeding who had undergone hypnosis upon a showing that the testimony
related to matters recalled prior to hypnosis, so long as its independence was reliably
shown.95 There the court did not mention the role that Ohio Evidence Rule 702 should
play but did note, however, that some courts had rejected this type ofwitness's testimony
either "because the technique of hypnotic memory enhancement has not been established under Frye"or because the scientifically recognized dangers of such testimony's
unreliability outweighed its probative value as a matter of law.9
The court inJohnstonfound that aperserule allowing the testimony of persons who
had been subject to hypnosis would "in some circumstances allow for the admission of
unreliable testimony," and that a per se rule of inadmissibility "would, in some instances, disallow reliable testimony, thus thwarting the truthseeking function of our
judicial system." g What the Johnston court did approve was a rule that, in cases where
hypnotically refreshed testimony is offered, trial courts "should hold a pretrial hearing
and apply a 'totality of the circumstances' test to determine the reliability of the proposed
testimony.'"

92 Statev. Williams,No. CA-1999, 1982 WL2940 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1982),aff'd466 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1983).
Id. at* 3.
See State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898,904 n. 5 (Ohio 1988).
at 903.
Id.
Id. at 904 (citations omitted).
Id. at 905 (quoting from State v. Iwakiri, 682 P2d 571,577-78 (Idaho 1984)).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 906 (citing Iwakiri, 682 P.2d at 578).
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Ten years after the effective date of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, Frye continued to
be applied, in one case which overruled the decision of State v. Thomas,1°m '' to the extent
that [Thomas] holds that expert testimony concerning the battered women syndrome
may not be admitted to support the affirmative defense of self-defense."'' Picking up
where Thomas left off, the Supreme Court in State v. Koss noted that in 1981 in Thomas
the Court found at the time that "no general acceptance of the expert's particular methodology has been established. '' 102 However, in the time since Thomas, there had developed a substantial body of research and law concerning the "battered wife syndrome,"
and it was found that expert testimony has been found to "assist the trier of fact to
understand evidence or to determine a fact in issue" (although not scientific testimony,
but rather"other specialized knowledge" admissible under Ohio Evidence Rule 702).1°1
Koss makes no mention of Ohio Evidence Rule 102, but it does cite three cases from
other jurisdictions that had likewise found that the 'battered woman syndrome' has
gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility."'" 4 In two of the three
cited cases, moreover, the records reflected that,priorto admittingthe expert's testimony
on the scientific foundations supporting the "battered woman syndrome," the courts had
held "Frye" hearings to determine whether the methodology used by the experts had
attained the requisite level of "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community. 05 Thus, Koss suggests a continuing reliance by the Supreme Court on the "general
acceptance" test announced in Frye.
If Ohio Evidence Rule 102 is to be read literally, it follows that common law
controlling the use of expert testimony would include the Fryetest, notwithstanding the
promulgation of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Common law is defined as "those principles, usages and rules of action applicable to the government and security of persons
and property which do not rest for their authority upon any express or positive statute or
other written declaration, but upon the statements of principles found in the decisions of
the courts."' ] Expert testimony, according to Frye, needs to be founded upon methodology that is shown to be "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community."°7
423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990).
See State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ohio 1990).
See id. at 972 (quoting from State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 140).
'o
I at 973.
Jd.
101 Id. at 974 (citing Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (Kan. 1986)
overruled by State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); People v. Torres, 488 N.YS.2d 358, 363 (Sup. CL 1985),.
10 See Torres, 488 N.Y.S. 2d at 361 ("A Frye hearing... was conducted outside the presence of the jury todetermine
the relevance of her expert opinion as well as its admissibility under the standards for acceptance of scientific
evidence."); Hodges, 716 P.2d at 563 ("[B]efore expert scientific opinion may be received into evidence, the basis
of that opinion must be shown to be generally acceptable within the expert's particular scientific field." (citing Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
101 O. JUR. 3D Words andPhrases 263-64 (1991).
107 Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
'o

101
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While Johnston suggests that Frye may well have passed away from the common law
in Ohio long before the Daubertdecision, Koss suggests thatFryeremains an important
means by which expert testimony may be measured.
Johnstonmakes it clear that the court is not necessarily aided by rigid per se rules
either for or against the admissibility of testimony based upon novel scientific methods
and theories. Rather, the search for truth remains dependent upon flexible tools, and, on
occasion, the proponents of novel methods and theories may bejustified in asserting that
the evidence warrants admission even if it is based upon theories that have not as yet
secured "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community. However, Ohio
Evidence Rule 102 may serve to retard the "growth and development of the law of
evidence"'1 contemplated by Federal Evidence Rule 102. One result, it appears, is that
the restrictions found in Ohio Evidence Rule 102 are simply not applied where circumstances warrant against a literal application of the Rule.
"Growth" v. "CommonLaw" : AnApplicationofRule 102 Underthe FederalRulesand
the Ohio Rules of Evidence
The inconsistent application of Ohio Evidence Rule 102 is revealed in the Ohio
Supipme Court's treatment of offers of hearsay statements made by a young child to
medical personnel in the context of a criminal trial where the defendant is charged with
child molestation. In one case, State v. Boston,1'1 Ohio Evidence Rule 102 was applied
to limit the range of the hearsay exception found at Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4), ° and
in State v. Dever,"' Ohio Evidence Rule 102 was found not to impose such a limit." 2
InBoston,the defendant appealed from his conviction of gross sexual imposition." 3
Among his issues on appeal, defendant challenged the use of out-of-court statements by
the two and a half year old victim which were made to a pediatrician in the course of a
physical examination during a child abuse investigation." 4 Also admitted were the
statements made by the child to a counsellor who was a specialist in child sexual abuse."'
The child's statements to both doctors implicated the defendant and were admitted at
trial, but the child herself was found to be "unavailable" for testimony upon questioning
by the trial judge." 6

IO,FED. R. Evm. 102.
109 545 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1989).
110 Id. at 1235-36.
"
112

596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio 1992).
Id. at 446.

'"

Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1225.
I'
Id. at 1223.

1

Id.

11

Id. at 1228.
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The Ohio Supreme Court considered no fewer than twelve rules of evidence in
deciding this case," 7 ultimately reversing the conviction after finding the defendant had
beendenied a fairtial basedupon the admission oftestimony fromthe two expertwitnesses.1n
In the course of its decision, the court described the role the Ohio Rules of Evidence play
in relation to common law and in contrast to that of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
it explained the limitation imposed upon the Ohio Rules by Evidence Rule 102.119
The Boston Court first noted that as of 1987, thirty-one states had adopted rules of
evidence that follow the federal rules and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and that each
(with the exception of Florida) has a rule of evidence similar to Federal Evidence Rule
102, 11 which states: '"These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined." ''
The court observed that, of the states adopting such a rule, only Ohio rewrote it,
deleting the phrase referring to "the promotion of growth and development of the law
of evidence" and adding a sentence involving interpreting the Ohio Rules of Evidence
to express common law.' "Accordingly," wrote the court, "Evid.R. 102 admonishes
the courts of Ohio to construe the Rules of Evidence in a manner consistent with the
common law."13 Perhaps anticipating the difficult task that lay ahead, the Court went
on in greater detail:
The Staff Note to Evid.R. 102 indicates that Evid.R. 102 was drafted with
the purpose in mind of limiting the power of Ohio courts to modify the
promulgated Rules of Evidence. This is inapposite to Fed.R. Evid. 102
which makes clear that the federal rules shall be construed to promotethe
growth and development of the law of evidence. Thus, Courts in every
other state which have adopted rules of evidence and courts in the federal
system are permitted to construe the rules of evidence broadly.

z Id. at 1227. "Our review of appellant's case necessarily requires us to review, discuss and interpret Evid.R. 102,
601(A), 702,703,704,705, 801(C), 801(D)(1)(c), 802, 803(2), 803(4) and
804(AX2)." Id.
"I Id. at 1227, 1239-40.
119 Id. at 1229.
12D Id.
121 FED. R. EVID. 102.
122 Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1229 (citing I GREGORY P.JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SAUTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA,
THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES 2.2 (1987).
123 Id.
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Ohio, on the other hand, based on Evid.R. 102, must construe the rules so
that they follow Ohio's common law unless the rule clearly indicates that
a change is intended."
In applying Ohio Evidence Rule 702 to the testimony of the two doctors who had
examined the child victim, the court found their"specialized knowledge" gained through
experience, training or education, warranted the admission of expert testimony from
both that abuse had occurred.'15 The court observed that the StaffNote to Ohio Evidence
Rule 702 states that the rule restates the law of Ohio as to the admissibility of testimony
from expert wimesses. 12 The Court elaborated:
The phrase "other specialized knowledge" is found in the rule and, accordingly, if a person has information which has been acquired by experience,
training or education which would assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or a fact in issue and the information is beyond common
experience, such person may testify. In testifying as to an opinion or
inference, the expert may use facts or data perceived by her or admitted in
evidence. EvidR. 703. Even if the expert's testimony provides an opinion
on an ultimate issue in a case, it is not objectionable. Evid.R. 704. After
there has been a disclosure of the underlying facts or data upon which the
expert bases her opinion, the expert may give her reasons for the opinion
or inference drawn by responding to a hypothetical question or otherwise.
Evid.R. 705. Of course, all of the foregoing is subject to the relevancy
requirements of Evid.R. 402 and 403.127
While the Court interpreted Ohio Evidence Rule 702 to permit the testimony of the
pediatrician and the counsellor as to the fact that the child had been abused, the Court
found inadmissible the further testimony of the pediatrician that the child had not fantasized her abuse and had notbeen programmed to make accusations againsther father.1
Likewise held inadmissible was the testimony of the counsellor as to the veracity of the
victim. 129 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that, in ihe federal courts and in

I Id. (emphasis in original).
125 Id. at 1238-39.

11 /d. at 1231 n.6.
IV Id. at 123 1.
Im Id. at 1240.
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sister states, Evidence Rule 803(4) 130is often utilized in child abuse cases and that such
cases extend the common law doctrine to admit statements made to a physician or
medical attendant without regard to the purpose of the examination or the need for the
patient's history. "In other words, the patient's statements are admissible even though
made to a physician consulted for the purpose of enabling the doctor to testify and even
31
when no treatment is contemplated.'
While state and federal cases cited by the court'3 do extend the common law
doctrine so as to permit the use of such statements even when the statement was not one
clearly anticipated in Evidence Rule 803(4),'133 Ohio common law allows no such extension. As mentioned by the court, the StaffNote to Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4) states that:
"Mhe exception is limited to those statements made by the patient which are reasonably
pertinent to an accurate diagnosis and should not be a conduit through which matters of
no medical significance should be admitted."'' "
The court in its analysis considered the application of Federal Evidence Rule 803(4)
in United States v. Nick,a3 a case involving a three-year-old victim of child abuse." In that
case,thcui tcourtidnotanalyzethechild'smotivatoninteningthedoctorabouttheevent,
but stated only that"[t]he child's declarations were corroborated by the doctor's examination
of the child's clothing .... 13" After noting that both Federal Evidence Rule 803(4) and Ohio
Evidence Rule 803(4) were identical'3, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "by discarding the motivational component of Evid.R. 803(4) and requiring physical corroboration,
the federal appellate court has rewritten the rle - or at least very liberally construed
the rule to promote the'.. growth and development of the law of evidence.... 111139

129 Id.

10 OHiO R. EVID. 803 provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(4) Statements for Purposes ofMedical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
Id.
131 Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1233 (citing Staff Note to Ohio R. Evid. 803(4)).
'
See id.
1
Le., it is not (1) a medical history, (2) past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or (3) a description of the
inception or general character of the cause or external source of the disease or injury, made by the patient forpurposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Id.

"3 Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1233 (quoting Staff Note to OHIO R. EVID. 803(4)).
1In 604F.2d 1199(9thCir. 1979).
136 Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1233.
I"

Id. at 1234 (citing United States v. Nick, 604 F2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979)).

13

Id.

139 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 102).
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However, the court went on to say that in Ohio, courts are not free to construe the
Ohio Rules of Evidence for the "promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence" as is provided for in the Federal Rules of Evidence,'40not even in the compelling case of alleged child abuse where the victim is by virtue of age not available to testify
in a court setting. The court observed:
As can be seen, applying Evid.R. 803(4) in child abuse cases involves
certain inherent dilemmas. Many courts have broadly interpreted Evid.R.
803(4) or its equivalent in order to avoid these problems so that the statements of children would be admissible. Although it is understandable that
courts would strive to admitthese statements, many courts appearso resultoriented that they emasculate Evid.R. 803(4) or its federal or sister-state
equivalent. Furthermore, since [Ohio] Evid.R. 102 requires that the Rules
of Evidence comply with Ohio's common law, unless the particular rule
specifically states otherwise, Ohio courts are prohibited from indulging in
a broad reading of Evid.R. 803(4). 141
Boston is instructive in its juxtaposition of the limitation imposed by Ohio Evidence
Rule 102 with other specific Rules of Evidence in a case which seemingly cries out for
abroad reading ofthe specific rule, but where commonlaw prohibits such a reading. The
lesson appears to be that Ohio Evidence Rule 102 means exactly what it says, that
construing the Rules carries with it an obligation to consult common law precedent when
determining the breadth of the Rules. As applied in Boston, Ohio Evidence Rule 102
tethered the scope and breadth of an important hearsay exception, even though doing so
had the result of requiring a new trial and possibly making it more difficult generally to
secure convictions against abusers of children too young to qualify as witnesses at trial.
Recognizing the sweep ofits decision, the court established its own set ofevidentiary
guidelines for use in child abuse cases and specifically expressed the hope that:
... the Ohio Supreme Court Rules Advisory Committee and the General
Assembly of Ohio will review the entire problem and promulgate rules and
statutes that will assist ourcourts in dealing with prosecutions in child abuse
cases. In that regard, we respectfully refer these matters to the rules committee and our state's legislative body. 142
FED. R. EviD. 102.
Boston, 545 N.E.2d at 1236.
"2 Id. at 1238. As a result of the Court's statement, on July 1, 1991, it adopted Ohio R. Evid. 807, which provides
specific instructions for detennining when out-of-court statements made by a child under age twelve describing
sexual acts performed by, with, or on the child are not excludable as hearsay under Ohio R. Evid. 802. Recently, in
In Re Coy, 616 N.E.2d 1105 (Ohio 1993), the Court found that R.C. 2151.35(F), a statute enacted in 1989 after the
facts in Boston occurred and designed to achieve the same goal as Ohio R. Evid. 807, but which established different
guidelines, was invalid. Noting Ohio R. Evid. 802, the Court stated that:
"o

1
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Four years after Boston was decided, the Ohio Supreme Court again had before it
the question of how Ohio Evidence Rule 102 should be applied to Ohio Evidence Rule
803(4). The context of the case was once again the admissibility of hearsay statements
given by a young child to medical personnel during the course of an investigation into
a charge of child molestation. In State v. Dever" 3 the defendant had been convicted of
rape based on an incident involving his four and a half year old adopted child.1 " Shortly

afterthe incident, the child had been examined by aphysician who did not detectphysical
signs of recent sexual conduct but did hear the child describe events that led to the
charge.

45

At trial, the court found the child incompetent to testify pursuant to Ohio Evidence
Rule 601146 and, over objection, permitted the examining physician to testify as to what
the child told her during the examination. 47 After being convicted, Dever argued on
appeal that the trial court erred by allowing the physician to testify as to the child's outof-court statements, and the court of appeals affirmed, recharacterizing the trial court's
determination under Ohio Evidence Rule 601 ' as a finding that the child was unavail-

able to testify under Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4). When finally presented to the Ohio
Supreme Court 49 the question was whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony pursuant to Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4)."-1

hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with
arule ofthe Supreme Court ofOhio, bythese rules, orby other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court
of Ohio.
Id. at 1108.
The Court went on to hold that "R.C. 2151.35(F) is inconsistent with Article VIII of the Ohio Rules of Evidence and,
as such, has no force or effect."
Id.
"4
596 N.E.2d 436 (Ohio 1992).
I" Id. at 438-39.
"4

Id. at 439.

I"

Id. at 436.

147 Id.

1, OmoR.EvID. 601 (GeneralRuleofCompetency) (presumably OhioEvid.R. 601(A): "Those of unsoundmind,
and children under ten (10) years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and
transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly....").
"'
Dever appealed the decision of the court of appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court, which overruled his motion for
leave to appeal. State v. Dever, 556 N.E.2d 526 (Ohio 1990). He then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which vacated thejudgment of the Hamilton County Court of Appeals, and remanded the cause to the appellate court
for further consideration in light of State v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Dever v. State, 498 U.S. 1009 (1990). The
court of appeals then reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. State v. Dever,
579 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1992). The state then took this appeal. Dever,596 N.E.2d at 439.
"0

Dever, 596 N.E.2d at 440.
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As the court states in its opening paragraph, 'This case presents the continuing
problem of reaching just results in child abuse cases involving statements made by young
children during the course of a medical examination." '' In order to reach those "just
15 2
While
results," the court carefully considered the Boston holding and "modified" it.
"recogniz[ing] that Evid.R. 102 significantly restricts our ability to interpret the Ohio
Rules of Evidence," the court found Boston to be too "restrictive" in its approach to
interpreting Ohio Evidence Rule 803(4).111 The court took issue with Boston's emphasis
onthe requirement that in order to be admissible under Evidence Rule 803(4), the child's
statement to the doctor must be related to the child's motivation for treatment:
Boston gives the impression that if the slightest possibility exists that the
child's statements were not motivated by her own desire to obtain medical
diagnosis or treatment, the statements may not come in as an Evid. R.
803(4) exception. We believe that it is not necessary to apply that approach
to every instance in which a child of tender years makes a statement in the
course of diagnosis and treatment. While we recognize that a young child
would probably not personally seek treatment, but would generally be
directed to treatment by an adult, we do not find that the child's statements
relating to medical diagnosis ortreatment are always untrustworthy for that
reason alone. 5'
In his dissent, Justice Wright took issue with this deviation from the interpretation
of Ohio Evidence Rule 102:
The majority's decision not only allows the child to speak through the
mouths of others in a situation where the child cannot be questioned, but
also gives the child's words the extra authority of being spoken by a doctor.
Moreover, the testimony does not possess the traditional guarantees of
reliability that form the basis for this particular hearsay exception. Evid.R.
102 mandates that this court construe the Ohio Rules of Evidence in accordance with the common-law basis for those rules. It is not the province of
this court to eviscerate those rules in order to make it easier for the state
to prosecute certain categories of crime. 55
That the majority's construction indeed does deviate from the commonlaw and may
thus be inappropriate under Ohio Evidence Rule 102 is suggested by Justice Resnick in

11

Id.

1

I at 443.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
IS
Id.at 443.
dissenting).
I$
Id. at 450 (Wright, J.,
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a note, which observed that the final version of Ohio Evidence Rule 102 was the result
of an overcautious response to fears of judicial over-reaching that accompanied the
drafting of Federal Evidence Rule 102:
Perhaps the time has come to reevaluate Ohio's Evid. R. 102 as it now
exists. While federal courts and courts of most states allow evolutionary
development of the law of evidence, Ohio courts are required to apply the
common law to evidence rules which are almost certainly inconsistent in
spirit, if not in literal wording, with many common-law foundations. An
amendment of Evid.R. 102, to put it in step with Fed.R.Evid. 102, is an idea
whose time has come. The drafters of Ohio's Evidence Rules feared dire
consequences if Ohio adopted an Evid.R. 102 identical to the federal version. See, Walinski & Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence:
The Case Against (1978), 28 Case WRes.L.Rev. 344, 370 (arguing that
Ohio's then-proposed Evid.R. 102, to be identical to Fed.R. Evid. 102,
constituted a"disturbing feature"of the evidence rules.). Ohio Evid.R. 102
was altered in response to such criticism, but the perceived horrors associated with the federal counterpart have not materialized. 5 6
The courtmakes reference to the "disturbing feature"of the proposed rules, referring
to the critique of the Rules found in Walinski &Abramoff's article, 'The Proposed Ohio
Rules of Evidence: The Case Against."157 The authors' concern, as noted by the Dever
court, was, in short, that the proposed rules would constitute an overbroad grant of
"discretion" to the trial judge to decide questions of admissibility of evidence. 158 The
article points out that "[d]iscretion recognized by the proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence
ranges from the trialjudge's traditional discretion in controlling such matters as the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses to several newly conceived areas of discretion." 15 9
Rule 403 expressly confers power upon the trial judge to exclude evidence
thatis otherwiseclearly admissibleunder some other principle ofevidence
if the judge, for example, feels that the evidence will "waste... time" or
mislead the jury. The breadth of discretion given by Rule 403 is as broad
as the Rules of Evidence themselves, for on its face Rule 403 'apparently
cuts across the entire body of the Rules, and allows ad hoc exclusion where
prejudice, time and the like are deemed to outweigh probativity.'6

I at 443 n.6.
ld.
Richard S. Walinski & Howard Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 344,370 (1978).
137

Is

Id. at 367.

Id.
160 Id. (footnotes omitted).
159
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This "broad discretion [conferred] on the trial judge to fashionhis own, case-by-case
exceptions to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible"16' is cast by the authors as
being "far more radical than first appears on the face of those rules that expressly grant
discretion."' 6 2 In stating the case against Federal Rule of Evidence 102 the authors
described the decision in the case of United States v. Batts.63 In Batts, the trial court
admitted extrinsic evidence introduced to impeach a testifying defendant with proof of
alleged prior misconduct' The evidence was admitted, although it would properly be
barred by Federal Evidence Rule 608(b). 1 The authors note the trial court's reliance on
Federal Rule 102, and its observation that a single rule of evidence (in this case, Federal
Evidence Rule 608(b)) should not be read in isolation.'" According to the authors,
Federal Evidence Rule 102 requires that "the trial judge must be given discretion to
ignore a rule of evidence, even one that Congress chose to make mandatory, ifhe believes
that the whole 'truth' as he perceived it, might not be served."'"
This proposed grant of discretion was unsettling to the authors, and, in their view,
Federal Evidence Rule 102 warranted furtherexamination before being adopted in Ohio
because of the absence of any role for the common law in the trial court's detenmination.'6
It is important to note, as a measure of the breadth of the trial judge's
discretion under this view, that when the court of appeals licensed the trial
judge to suspend the Federal Rule in the service of truth, it neither held nor
suggested that the suspension of the Federal Rules of Evidence reinstates
the common law rule on the issue. The trial judge's pursuit of truth is thus

utterly without guide or rule, except for the subjective beacon of truth itself.' 69

Id. at 368.
I0 at 369.
Id.
1
558 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1977).
16
Id. The defendant was charged with certain crimes relating to hashish. When arrested he had a "coke" spoon
around his neck. At trial, he denied on cross-examination any knowledge that the "coke" spoon is commonly used
to sniff cocaine. Id. at 514-15. See also Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 157, at 369, n.102. The government
produced testimony that several months before the defendant had sold a large amount of cocaine to an undercover
agent. Bats, 558 E2d at 516. No conviction resulted, however, because of an illegal search and seizure. Id. See also
Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 157, at 369.
10 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) in pertinent part provides: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
ofattacking or supporting his credibility, otherthan a conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not beproved
by extrinsic evidence." Id.
"6
Batts, 558 F.2d at 517, noted in Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 157, at 369, n. 107.
", Walinski & Abramoff, supra note 157, at 369-70.
10 Id. at 370.
"

30

Id.
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Twenty-five years of evidentiary jurisprudence gives some cause to believe the
authors' concerns have not materialized, as Justice Resnick notes in Deverin her call to
amend Ohio Evidence Rule 102.170 Moreover, the authors appear to have overlooked the
negative implications of restricting the powers of the trial judge to only those readily
available under the common law. The common law may never have anticipated the rapidity
of advances in science and the legal complexities that accompany such advances. While
Daubertmakes plain the need for active jurisprudence and an informed bench when a
court is confronted with novel scientific methodology, Ohio common law simply does
not accommodate a trial court's need to participate in such sophisticated and technically
complex litigation. And even though the Federal approach may have been troubling (in
the abstract) twenty-five years ago, it now predominates the field in much the same way
that Frye dominated the field until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A ProposalforChange
In Ohio courts, as in courts across the country and around the world, science and the
law meet daily, often with results that properly serve neither discipline. A trial court
should be in a position to secure the best evidence, and such evidence in a technical
setting frequently involves novel methodologies. However, courts may be unprepared
to separate the meritorious scientific analysis from the modem forms of quackery that
might attempt entry into the courtroom. As Judge Patrick Higginbotham stated in
describing the court's role in the admissibility of expert testimony, "it is time to take hold
of expert testimony in federal trials."171 There is no good reason for not doing the same
in Ohio trials.
In order to realize the potential offered inDaubert,two rules should be reexamined:
Ohio Evidence Rule 102 should be amended to match the language found in Federal
Evidence Rule 102. Ohio's body of law should not have to tolerate the inconsistencies
shown in the cases construing Ohio Evidence Rule 102 where it is readily apparent that
the restriction imposed by Ohio Evidence Rule 102 is neither needed nor helpful.
The demand for a more scientifically informed judiciary has never been more
evident. Recent developments in science covering diverse topics such as the medical
implications of silicone breast implants, work-related issues like repetitive stress injury,
and concerns of microwave radiation associated with the widespread use of cellular
telephones are indicative of the need to anticipate a heavy burden on the courts as claims
arising from harms associated with such innovations increasingly become the subject of
lawsuits. l 2
State v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436,443 n. 6 (Ohio 1992).
m Skaggs, supra note 2, at 1201 (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.
1986)).

'~

"2

See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, supra note 1,at 14.
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Amending Ohio Evidence Rule 102 will not, of course, greatly ease the trial court's

task when confronting novel scientific methodology. Daubert foresees battles between

qualified experts who, by their forensic presentations, will enable a court to resolve the

relative merits of a given case. "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-

ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."'

73

The success of such an

exchange in the federal forum rests, in part, on the court's ability to appoint its own
experts as provided forby Federal Evidence Rule 706.4 Ohio has no similar rule or law
but relies instead on piecemeal legislation or common law to determine whether the court
may appoint specific types of expert witnesses. 75 The advantages of Federal Evidence
Rule 706 include the provision for the court, if need be, to call the witness, and (in civil

of such expert to "the parties in such proportion and at such
litigation) to charge the cost
1 76
time as the court directs."'

"7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786,2798 (1993) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44,61 (1987)).
174 FED. R. EVID. 706 entitled "Court Appointed Experts," provides:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit
nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court
unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties
by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the
witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may
be called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in
whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds which may
be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation
under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid
by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like
manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure
to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits theparties in calling expert witnesses
of their own selection.
Id.
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §120.33(D) (Anderson 1990), which "is arguably broad enough to encompass
'7
funds sought to employ an expert witness" for DUI defendants. State v. McLaughlin, 562 N.E.2d 1387, 1391 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988).
176 FED. R. EVID. 706(b).
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CONCLUSION

Daubertbrings attention to a need to "take control" over the process by which novel
scientific testimony is offered in court. Trial judges and administrative agency hearing
officers throughout the State of Ohio are made aware of this need on an increasingly
frequent basis as technological innovations make their way to the courtroom and hearing
room. Daubert also points out that there is, in the federal evidence scheme, an expectation that the courts will become active participants in advancing "scientific knowledge" in the courtroom. 177 Are Ohio's courts likely to be able to meet this challenge?
A recent Report of the Camegie Commission entitled "Science and Technology in
Judicial Decision Making--Creating Opportunities and Meeting Challenges"" offers
this assessment:
The courts' ability to handle complex science-rich cases has recently been
called into question, with widespread allegations that the judicial system is
increasingly unable to manage and adjudicate science and technology issues. Critics have objected that judges cannot make appropriate decisions
because they lack technical training, that jurors do not comprehend the
complexity of the evidence they are supposed to analyze, and that the expert
wimesses on whom the system relies ame mercenaries whose biased testimony frequently produces erroneous and inconsistent determinations. If
these claims go unanswered, or are not dealt with, confidence in the judiciary will be undermined as the public becomes convinced that the courts
as now constituted are incapable of correctly resolving some of the most
pressing legal issues of our day. There may be calls to replace the current
system with new institutions and procedures that appear to be more suited
to the demands of science and technology. 179
Ohio courts need the ability to respond to the new demands of science. Courts
needing expert testimony on novel scientific methodologies should be free to benefit
from the Daubertdecision and should not be restricted to admitting only such evidence
as would bepermitted underOhiocommonlaw. Using Federal EvidenceRule 706 as amodel,
Ohio courts could be empowered to retain the services of experts in service not to the parties
but instead to the court As observed in the Carnegie Commission's report, "confidence in the
judiciary" 1 0 requires that the public be confident that the court is a place where, when
circumstances demand, even complex and novel scientific theories can be presented and
applied or rejected as appropriate. Anything short of that will not likely withstand the
test of time.
"

Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at2795.

1

CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T. supra note 1.

18

I' ld. at 11.
Id.
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